Subjects:

Jurisprudence, Criminology

Contents:

I. The Role of Causation in Moral and Legal Responsibility

II. Presuppositions about the Nature of Causation by Legal Doctrines

III. The First Blind Alley: The Attempt to Replace Proximate Causation with Culpability as a Prerequisite to Legal Liability

IV. The Legal Supposition of There Being 'Intervening Causes'

VI. The Metaphysics of the Causal Relation

• Provides the fullest account available of the philosophical foundations of the law of causation, clarifying its role in attributing responsibility
• Develops from the philosophical analysis a powerful case for reforming the law in several key areas, including intervening causation and forseeability of harm
• Presents a compelling argument against the use of risk analysis as an alternative to causation

The concept of causation is fundamental to ascribing moral and legal responsibility for events. Yet the relationship between causation and responsibility remains unclear. What precisely is the connection between the concept of causation used in attributing responsibility and the accounts of causal relations offered in the philosophy of science and metaphysics? How much of what we call causal responsibility is in truth defined by non-causal factors? This book argues that much of the legal doctrine on these questions is confused and incoherent, and offers the first comprehensive attempt since Hart and Honoré to clarify the philosophical background to the legal and moral debates.

The book first sets out the place of causation in criminal and tort law and outlines the metaphysics presupposed by the legal doctrine. It then analyses the best theoretical accounts of causation in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, and using these accounts criticises many of the core legal concepts surrounding causation - such as intervening causation, forseeability of harm and complicity. It considers and rejects the radical proposals to eliminate the notion of causation from law by using risk analysis to attribute responsibility. The result of the analysis is a powerful argument for revising our understanding of the role played by causation in the attribution of legal and moral responsibility.