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Vol 23 No 5 May/June 2018

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Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis

Edited by: Bruce Lyons

ISBN13: 9780521713504
Published: September 2009
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: UK
Format: Paperback
Price: £35.99

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Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life.

The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization.

Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.

  • Written by Europe’s leading competition academics, many of whom advised on the cases featured in the book
  • Features seventeen different actual European cases, representing a wide range of issues addressed in competition policy
  • Non-technical and accessible style makes the book suitable for a wide range of readers, including lawyers, practitioners, economics undergraduates and law postgraduates

Competition Law
List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce Lyons

Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power: Introduction
Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position:
1. Michelin II: the treatment of rebates Massimo Motta
2. Interoperability and market foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
Section 2. Market Investigations:
3. Mobile call termination in the UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright
4. Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets (2000) Paul Dobson

Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction
Section 1. Cartels:
5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter? Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan
6. Assessment of damages in the district heating pipe cartel Peter Mollgaard
Section 2. Other Horizontal Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet
8. The orders and rules of British horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided sport? Bruce Lyons
Section 3. Vertical Agreements:
9. Efficiency enhancing or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car distribution in Europe Frank Verboven
10. Beer - the ties that bind Michael Waterson
11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit

Part III. Mergers: Introduction
Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects:
12. A merger in the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi
13. Merger simulations of unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry? Margaret Slade
Section 2. Coordinated Effects:
14. The ups and downs of the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright
15. Capacity constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kuhn and John Van Reenen
Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects:
16. Vertical effects between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in Finland Rune Stenbacka
17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects: the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero