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Wildy’s Book News

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Vol 23 No 4 April/May 2018

Book of the Month

Cover of Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks: Executors, Administrators and Probate

Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks: Executors, Administrators and Probate

Edited by: Alexander Learmonth, Charlotte Ford, Julia Clark, John Ross Martyn
Price: £295.00

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UK Public Holiday Monday 28th May

Wildy's will be closed on Monday 28th May, re-opening on Tuesday 29th.

Online book orders received during the time we are closed will be processed as soon as possible once we re-open on Tuesday.

As usual credit cards will not be charged until the order is processed and ready to despatch.

Any Sweet & Maxwell or Lexis eBook orders placed after 4pm on the Friday 25th May will not be processed until Tuesday May 29th. UK orders for other publishers will be processed as normal. All non-UK eBook orders will be processed on Tuesday May 29th.

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The Advantage of Competitive Federalism for Securities Regulation Revised ed

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ISBN13: 9780844741734
ISBN: 0844741736
Published: December 2002
Publisher: The AEI Press
Format: Paperback
Price: £12.99



In this incisive analysis of securities regulation, Roberta Romano demonstrates that the current approach toward U.S. securities regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission should be revamped by implementing a regime of competitive federalism. Under such a system firms would select their regulator from among the fifty states, the District of Columbia, the SEC, or other nations. She asserts that competitive federalism harnesses the high-powered incentives of markets to the regulatory state to produce regulatory arrangements compatible with investors' incentives. Firms will locate in the domicile investors prefer so as to reduce the cost of capital, and states will have financial incentives, such as incorporation and registration fees, to adapt their securities regimes to firms' domicile decisions. Romano contends that empirical evidence does not indicate that the SEC is effective in achieving its stated objectives. The commission's expansions of disclosure requirements have not had a significant impact on investors' wealth. Indeed, she contends, evidence from institutional equity and debt markets and cross-country listing practices have shown that firms voluntarily disclose

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