Wildy Logo
(020) 7242 5778
enquiries@wildy.com

Book of the Month

Cover of Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata

Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata

Price: £449.99

Lord Denning: Life, Law and Legacy



  


Welcome to Wildys

Watch


NEW EDITION Pre-order The Law of Rights of Light 2nd ed



 Jonathan Karas


Offers for Newly Called Barristers & Students

Special Discounts for Newly Called & Students

Read More ...


Secondhand & Out of Print

Browse Secondhand Online

Read More...


Insider Dealing and Criminal Law: Dangerous Liaisons


ISBN13: 9783642228568
Published: November 2011
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Country of Publication: Germany
Format: Hardback
Price: £112.00



Despatched in 10 to 12 days.

This work is a multidisciplinary analysis of the issue of insider dealing from the perspective of the applicability of criminal law to regulate it. First, it examines the nature of its prohibition in the European Union and in the United States of America. The text includes a more extensive overview of prohibition in four Member States of the European Union (France, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Poland). Then, it summarises the arguments presented by ethicists and economists in favour of and against insider dealing. Further, it analyses the foundations of criminal law and justifications that are given for its application. On the basis of this analysis, it presents a new two-step theory of criminalisation. The first step is based on a liberal theory of wrongfulness that makes reference to protection of the basic human rights. The second step relies on classical but often forgotten principles of criminal law. Finally, it examines possible alternatives to criminal rules.

Subjects:
Criminal Law, Banking and Finance
Contents:
Introduction.
Insider dealing prohibition -- basic construction, economic and ethical perspectives.
Practical issues arising from the transposition of the Market Abuse Directive into the chosen Member States' legal systems.
Principles-based application of the criminal law.
Alternative models of regulation of insider dealing.
Conclusions.