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This book challenges Mancur Olson's famous observation that concentrated interests inevitably dominate diffuse ones in democracies by presenting an alternative view that strong, independent courts can effectively protect the rights of diffuse interests against powerful, concentrated groups.
Drawing on diverse examples from national and international courts, this book demonstrates how judicial institutions can rebalance democratic power dynamics. The analysis contributes to two fundamental debates in law and social sciences: the competition between diffuse and concentrated interests in democratic systems, and the evolving societal role of courts at both national and international levels. Dothan argues that courts support diffuse interests not due to judges' ideologies, but through structural incentives that make such support strategically beneficial. Even when courts cannot directly help diffuse interests or when their judgments face compliance issues, they still strengthen these groups by providing information and motivation for political engagement.
Elites, Power Struggles, and the Law will be of interest to scholars and students of socio-legal studies, international law, and comparative law, as well as others with relevant interests in sociology and political science.
