The eBooks we sell are sold as a single-user licence and are intended for the end user only.
The sale of some eBooks are restricted to certain countries. To alert you to such restrictions, please select the country of the billing address of your credit or debit card you wish to use for payment.
For further information see https://www.wildy.com/ebook-formats
Once the order is confirmed an e-mail will be sent to you to allow you to download the eBook. For UK purchases this will be automatic. For purchases outside the UK a member of staff will need to confirm the sale. (Staff are available to do this during normal business hours, Mon-Fri 8:30-17:00 UK time)
All eBooks are supplied firm sale and cannot be returned. If you believe there is a fault with your eBook then contact us on ebooks@wildy.com and we will help in resolving the issue. This does not affect your statutory rights.
Due to a technical issue some ebooks are not available to order.
This volume focuses on constitutional ratification, the procedure in which a draft constitution is submitted by its creators to the people or their representatives in an up or down vote determining implementation. Ratification is increasingly common and routinely recommended by experts. Nonetheless, it is neither neutral nor inevitable. Constitutions can be made without it and when it is used it has significant effects. This raises the central question of the book: should ratification be recommended? Put another way: is there a reason for treating the procedure as a default for the constitution-making process? Surprisingly, these questions are rarely asked. The procedure's worth is assumed, not demonstrated, while ratification is generally overlooked in the literature. In fact, this is the first sustained study of ratification.
To address these oversights, this book defines ratification and its types, explains the procedure's effects, conceptual origins, and history, and then concentrates on finding reasons for its use. Specifically, it builds up and analyzes the three most likely normative justifications. These urge the implementation of ratification because the procedure: enables the constituent power to make its constitution; fosters representation during constitution-making; or helps create a legitimate constitution.
Ultimately, these justifications are found wanting, leading to the conclusion that ratification lacks a convincing, context-independent justification. Thus, until new arguments are developed, experts should not give recommendations for ratification as a matter of course, practitioners should not reach for it uncritically, and-more generally-one should avoid the blanket application of concepts from democratic theory to extraordinary contexts such as constitution-making.
