With the majority of the global population still living under surprisingly stable autocratic regimes, we can assume that regime stability is the ultimate objective of autocratic leadership. However, this stability is continually challenged, so autocrats deploy various instruments to defend their hegemonic power.
Constitutional Change under Autocracy examines one such instrument, the strategic use of constitutional amendments to reinforce regime stability. Through a large-N comparative analysis and illustrative case studies of Azerbaijan, Mexico, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), this book demonstrates that constitutional amendments are far more than technical legal adjustments. Instead, they serve as deliberate tools for consolidating power, managing internal rivalries, and mitigating external threats. By enhancing - or attempting to enhance-regime legitimacy, these amendments can play a pivotal role in stabilizing autocratic regimes.
Insightful and analytical, this book reflects on the implications of the instrumentalization of law and challenges our expectations about the role of constitutions under autocracy.
