The idea of status has long puzzled philosophers. Some people have higher social status than others, and some have distinct legal statuses, such as being an employee, a tenant, or a refugee. But why should that be the case? Why should some enjoy more esteem than others? And why should law pick out a class of persons, give it a label, and treat it differently?
Status in Law and Morality provides a philosophical account of status, arguing that it is a moral, and not just a legal or social, idea. The point of status is to protect the weaker party in social relations - the employee, or the tenant - through social recognition of their role as well as through legal regulation. Tracing the origins of the idea of status in law and in moral philosophy, this book challenges the commonly held view that status is an inherently inegalitarian idea that should have no place in modern law. It instead distinguishes between 'rank' and 'role' based statuses and argues that law ought to boost the self-esteem of those who hold vulnerable social roles.
