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Economics of Financial Law

Edited by: Geoffrey P. Miller

ISBN13: 9781783471829

Published: February 2016

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited

Country of Publication: UK

Format: Hardback, 2 Volumes

Price: £50.00

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Covering the most important areas of the subject, such as financial crises, the nature of the banking firm and issues in bank regulation, Economics of Financial Law is a comprehensive collection of the papers that have shaped the field of financial law.

The original introduction by editor Professor Geoffrey Miller provides a thorough and authoritative examination of the material and, together with the articles included, will prove to be an invaluable resource for academics and practitioners alike.

Subjects:: Banking and Finance, Law and Economics

Contents:: Volume I; Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller; PART I THE NATURE OF THE BANKING FIRM; 1. George J. Benston (2004), ‘What’s Special About Banks?’, Financial Review, 39 (1), February, 13–33; 2. Martin Hellwig (1998), ‘Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (1), March, 328–45; 3. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy C. Stein (2002), ‘Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking’, Journal of Finance, 57 (1), February, 33–73; 4. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2001), ‘Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking’, Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2), April, 287–327; PART II SHADOW BANKS; 5. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2010), ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 41 (2), Fall, 261–312; 6. Morgan Ricks (2012), ‘A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 (5), October, 1289–360; PART III LIQUIDITY; 7. Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn (1991), ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements’, American Economic Review, 81 (3), June, 497–513; 8. Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi (1990), ‘Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation’, Journal of Finance, 45 (1), March, 49–71; PART IV LENDING; 9. Gary Gorton and James Kahn (2000), ‘The Design of Bank Loan Contracts’, Review of Financial Studies, 13 (2), April, 331–64; 10. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’, Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (2), June, 117–61; 11. Douglas W. Diamond (1984), ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3), July, 393–414; 12. Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero (1997), ‘The Theory of Financial Intermediation’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21 (11–12), December, 1461–85; PART V CAPITAL; 13. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2000), ‘A Theory of Bank Capital’, Journal of Finance, 55 (6), December, 2431–65; 14. Berry K. Wilson and Edward J. Kane (1996), ‘The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders’, NBER Working Paper No.; 5848, December, i, 2–24, notes; 15. Benjamin C. Esty (1998), ‘The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking’, Journal of Financial Economics, 47 (2), February, 189–218; 16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2011), ‘Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight’, Columbia Law Review, 111 (4), May, 795–847; 17. Patrick Bolton and Frédéric Samama (2012), ‘Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert’, Economic Policy, 27 (70), April, 277–317; 18. Charles W. Calomiris and Richard J. Herring (2013), ‘How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25 (2), Spring, 39–62; PART VI BANK RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK; 19. Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3), June, 401–19; 20. Charles W. Calomiris (1990), ‘Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic History, 50 (2), June, 283–95; Index; Volume II; Acknowledgements; An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I; PART I FINANCIAL CRISES; 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933), ‘First Fireside Chat, Delivered on 12th March 1933’, [accessed at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14540, 09.07.2015], re-set; 2. Viral V. Acharya (2009), ‘A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation’, Journal of Financial Stability, 5 (3), September, 224–55; 3. Steven L. Schwarcz (2008), ‘Systemic Risk’, Georgetown Law Journal, 97 (1), 193–249; 4. Ben S. Bernanke (1983), ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 73 (3), June, 257–76; 5. Erik F. Gerding (2009), ‘Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis’, Washington Law Review, 84 (2), 127–98; 6. Geoffrey P. Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld (2010), ‘Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 33 (2), March, 807–40; 7. Martin F. Hellwig (2009), ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis’, De Economist, 157 (2), June, 129–207; PART II ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION; 8. Kenneth E. Scott (1977), ‘The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation’, Stanford Law Review, 30 (1), November, 1–50; 9. Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey (1988), ‘The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System’, Cornell Law Review, 73 (4), May, 677–718; 10. Roberta Romano (2014), ‘For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture’, Yale Journal on Regulation, 31 (1), Winter, 1–76; 11. Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz (2011), ‘Regulatory Contrarians’, North Carolina Law Review, 89 (5), 1629–79; 12. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine (2004), ‘Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13 (2), April, 205–48; 13. Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl (2013), ‘Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation’, American Economic Review, 103 (3), May, 1–5; PART III GOVERNANCE; 14. KJ Hopt (2013), ‘Corporate Governance of Banks and Other Financial Institutions After the Financial Crisis’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 13 (2), October, 219–53; 15. Lucian A. Bebchuk (2010), ‘How to Fix Bankers’ Pay’, Daedalus, 139 (4), Fall, 52–60; PART IV CENTRAL BANKS; 16. C A E Goodhart (2010), ‘The Changing Role of Central Banks’, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Working Papers, 326, vii, ix, 1–23; 17. Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler (2001), ‘Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91 (2), May, 253–7; 18. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25 (2), May, 151–62; PART V CONSUMER BANKING; 19. Oren Bar-Gill (2009), ‘The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts’, Cornell Law Review, 94, 1073–151; 20. Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren (2008), ‘Making Credit Safer’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157 (1), November, 1–101; 21. Michael S. Barr (2004), ‘Microfinance and Financial Development’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 26 (27), Fall, 271–96; Index