This book critically discusses the constitutional scope of the EU’s authority over Member States’ fiscal policy. For that purpose, the volume analyses the legal framework of economic governance and considers the EU powers with regard to the constitutional principles of political equilibrium established in the EU Treaties. The objective is two-fold: first, to understand what the EU can do regarding the definition of national economic policy, and, second, to assess that degree of power from a federal point of view.
This book intends to reflect on the legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union by looking at how the balance of power between the EU and the Member States in the area of economic governance is organized. The work is innovative because, on the one hand, it dissects the many procedures and powers of EU economic governance, considering the level of obligation they impose on Member States, while, on the other hand, it analyses such powers from the perspective of federalism: a political and legal theory focused on the organization and legitimation of authority within a compound polity.
This is the first book that develops a federal analysis of the EU powers of economic governance, unearthing along the way in a clear and comprehensible way the many different contradictions, complexities, and constitutional disequilibriums that exist in this policy area, and their problematic consequences for EU integration. Therefore, it provides research developments of interest to scholars and researchers of the Economic and Monetary Union, federalism studies, and EU constitutional law in general.
