Fiscal federalism is a longstanding subject of scholarly inquiry but has acquired renewed significance as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have exposed tensions between central revenue control and subnational spending responsibilities. Questions concerning the division of tax bases, the distribution of taxing powers and revenues, and the management of intergovernmental fiscal relations have taken on new urgency.
Fiscal Federalism: Law, Politics, and Economics examines these questions across federal, quasi-federal, devolved, unitary, and supranational systems. It adopts a comparative and interdisciplinary approach to analysing the allocation of tax bases and the mechanisms for sharing revenues, while considering how constitutional rules, political institutions, and economic pressures shape fiscal relations between central and subnational governments. The volume identifies common themes that emerge across otherwise diverse systems, reflects on practices and innovations developed in response to crisis, and assesses their wider relevance. Its central premise is that fiscal federalism is not merely a technical matter of public finance, but also a question of legal authority, political choice, institutional design, and public accountability. It shows that fiscal federalism is not a fixed constitutional settlement, but a continuing process of institutional adjustment shaped by law, politics, and economics.
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