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Vol 21 No 9 Sept/Oct 2016

Book of the Month

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Goode on Commercial Law

Edited by: Ewan McKendrick
Price: £170.00

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Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

Keith N. HyltonBoston University

ISBN13: 9780521790314
ISBN: 052179031X
Published: March 2005
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: UK
Format: Hardback
Price: £84.99

Despatched in 7 to 9 days.

This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three perspectives offers something new to every student of antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizontal mergers, and conglomerates.

Competition Law
Part I. Economics:
1. Definitions
2. Perfect competition versus monopoly
3. Further topics
Part II. Law and Policy:
4. Some interpretations issues
5. Enacting the antitrust law
6. What should antitrust law aim to do?
Part III. Enforcement:
7. Optimal enforcement theory
8. Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws
Part IV. Cartels:
9. Cartels
10. Conscious parallelism
11. Conclusion
Part V. Development of Section 1 Doctrine:
12. The Sherman act versus the common law
13. Rule of reason and per se rule
14. Conclusion
Part VI. Rule of Reason and Per Se Rule:
14. The case for price-fixing
15. Per se and rule of reason analysis: further developments
16. Per se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per se rule
Part VII. Agreement:
17. The development of inference doctrine
18. Rejection of unilateral contract theory
Part VIII. Facilitating Mechanisms:
19. Data dissemination cases
20. Basing point pricing and related practices
21. Basing point pricing: economics
Part IV. Boycotts:
22. Pre-Socony
23. Post-Socony
24. Post-BMI/Sylvania
25. Conclusion
Part X. Monopolization:
26. Development of section 2 doctrine
27. Leveraging and essential facility cases
28. Predatory pricing
29. Conclusion
Part XI. Power:
30. Measuring market power
31. Determinants of market power
32. Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane
33. Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa
34. Measuring power: guidelines
Part XII. Attempts:
35. The Swift formula and modern doctrine
36. Dangerous probability requirement
Part XIII. Vertical Restraints:
37. Resale price maintenance
38. Vertical non-price restraints
39. Manufacturer retains title
40. Agreement
Part XIV. Tying and Exclusive Dealing:
41. Introduction
42. Early cases
43. Development of the per se rule
44. Tension between rule of reason arguments and per se rule
45. Technological tying
46. Exclusive dealing
47. Horizontal Mergers:
48. Reasons for merging and implications for law
49. Horizontal merger law
50. Conclusion
Part XV. Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate:
51. Vertical mergers
52. Conglomerate mergers
53. Concluding remarks
Part XVI. Antitrust and the state:
54. Noerr-Pennington doctrine
55. Parker doctrine.