This volume presents a selection of readings in the political economy of Japanese law.
Part 1 Judges, politicians and bureaucrats: A) economic regulation: privatizing regulation - the implementation of the large-scale retail stores law, Frank K. Upham; the man who whould import - a cautionary tale about bucking the system in Japan, Frank K. Upham; evaluating administrative guidance and cartels in Japan, David Weinstein; policies for small business in Japan, Yoshiro Miwa; B) political constraints on bureaucrats: the appearance of power - legislators, bureaucrats and the budget process in the United States and Japan, Mathew McCubbins and Gregory Noble; as a matter of factions - the budgetary implications of shifting factional control in Japan's LDP, Mathew McCubbins and Michael F. Thies; C) political constraints on judges: the puzzling (in)dependence of courts - a comparative approach; administrative control of Japanese judges, Setsuo Miyazawa; judicial independence in Japan revisited, John O. Haley; judicial independence in a civil law regime - the evidence from Japan, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen; why the Japanese taxpayer always loses, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen; D) judicial constraints on bureaucrats: Japanese administrative law - introduction, John O'Haley; rethinking administrative guidance, J. Mark Ramseyer.
Part 2 Corporate governance: manufacturer-supplier relations in Japan and the concept of relation-specific skill, Banri Asanuma; legal rules and social norms in Japan's secret world of sumo, Mark West; top executive rewards and firm performance - a comparison of Japan and the United States, Steven N. Kaplan; the market for innovation in the United States and Japan - venture capital and the comparative corporate governance debate, Curtis J. Milhaupt.
Part 3 Conclusion: the development of Japanese legal studies in American law schools, Frank K. Upham.