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Vol 21 No 9 Sept/Oct 2016

Book of the Month

Cover of Goode on Commercial Law

Goode on Commercial Law

Edited by: Ewan McKendrick
Price: £170.00

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Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law

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Edited by: Thomas J. Miceli, Matthew J. Baker

ISBN13: 9781783471737
Published: June 2015
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Country of Publication: UK
Format: Paperback (Hardback in 2013)
Price: £35.00
Hardback edition , ISBN13 9781781000144

Despatched in 4 to 6 days.

One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law. The contributors employ a variety of economic methodologies to explore a wide range of topics, including torts, contracts, property, crime, employment, the environment, and legal procedure. This depth and breadth of scholarship reflect the continuing vitality of the economic approach to law, offering an illuminating look into the future of the field and providing inspiration and guidance for the next generation of theorists. This timely volume will appeal to students, professors and researchers in both law and economics, particularly those with an interest in the theoretical and practical intersections of the two fields.

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Jurisprudence, Law and Economics
Introduction Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker
1. Land Assemblage: Efficiency and Equity in Public - Private Projects Zachary Grossman, Jonathan Pincus and Perry Shapiro
2. The Economics of Activity Levels in Tort Liability and Regulation Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen
3. Liability versus Regulation for Product-Related Risks Thomas J. Miceli, Rebecca Rabon and Kathleen Segerson
4. Regulation versus Liability: A Behavioral Economics Perspective Kathleen Segerson and Tsvetan Tsventanov
5. Strict Liability When Victims Choose the Value of the Asset at Risk Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe
6. Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform Under Self-Serving Bias Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov
7. Tort Standards and Legal Expenditures: A Unified Model Jef De Mot and Ben Depoorter
8. Litigation Success Functions Jef De Mot
9. The Optimal Amount of Distorted Testimony When the Arbiter Can and Cannot Commit Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
10. Do Exclusionary Rules Convict the Innocent? Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa and Richard McAdams
11. Search, Seizure, and False (?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies When Police Can Plant Evidence Dhammika Dharmapala and Thomas J. Miceli
12. Crime, Expectations, and the Deterrence Hypothesis - Matthew J. Baker and Niklas J. Westelius
13. Active Courts and Menu Contracts Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
14. The Efficiency of Affirmative Action with Purely Historical Discrimination Abraham L. Wickelgren
15. The Multi-layered Action of Trademark: Meaning, Law and Market Giovanni B. Ramello