Wildy Logo
(020) 7242 5778
enquiries@wildy.com

Book of the Month

Cover of Company Directors: Duties, Liabilities and Remedies

Company Directors: Duties, Liabilities and Remedies

Edited by: Mark Arnold KC, Simon Mortimore KC
Price: £275.00

Lord Denning: Life, Law and Legacy



  


Welcome to Wildys

Watch


NEW EDITION Pre-order Mortgage Receivership: Law and Practice



 Stephanie Tozer, Cecily Crampin, Tricia Hemans
Practical guidance to relevant law & procedure


Offers for Newly Called Barristers & Students

Special Discounts for Newly Called & Students

Read More ...


Secondhand & Out of Print

Browse Secondhand Online

Read More...


Easter Closing

We will be closed between Friday 29th March and Monday 1st April for the Easter Bank Holidays, reopening at 8.30am on Tuesday 2nd April. Any orders received during this period will be processed with when we re-open.

Hide this message

Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

Edited by: Fred S. McChesney

ISBN13: 9781849801362
Published: November 2011
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Country of Publication: UK
Format: Hardback
Price: £302.00



Despatched in 4 to 6 days.

This volume provides an essential overview of one of the most important developments in economics, finance and law of the past generation: the growing realization of how the market for corporate control functions and why its operation is of crucial importance. Presenting seventeen seminal contributions, the book illustrates the importance of corporate control changes - mergers, acquisitions and other takeovers - in helping to align the interests of corporate shareholders and their managers. The mechanics of various takeover techniques (poison pills, greenmail and other gambits) are also explored alongside empirical research concerning the functioning of the market for corporate control. Including an original introduction, this book will appeal to researchers interested in a summary of the growing appreciation of the market for corporate control, and also to others seeking to understand this aspect of the relationship between the economics and the law of the modern corporation.

Subjects:
Competition Law, Company Law, Mergers and Acquisitions
Contents:
Acknowledgements Introduction Fred S. McChesney PART I BACKGROUND 1. R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm' PART II THE PERECEIVED PROBLEM 2. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means (1933), 'The Divergence of Interest between Ownership and Control' 3. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure' 4. Michael C. Jensen (1986), 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers' PART III MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 5. Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' 6. William J. Carney (1999), 'The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm' 7. Fred S. McChesney (1999), 'Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control' PART IV HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: INTERNAL ISSUES 8. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer' 9. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers' 10. David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1987), 'Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers' 11. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), 'Corporate Control Transactions' 12. Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas (2004), 'The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions' PART V HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: EXTERNAL ISSUES 13. William J. Carney and Leonard A. Silverstein (2003), 'The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill' 14. Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), 'A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail' 15. John C. Coates, IV (2001), 'Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers' PART VI EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 16. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence' 17. Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter (1988) 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980'