Wildy logo
(020) 7242 5778
enquiries@wildy.com

Wildy’s Book News

Book News cover photo

Vol 21 No 10 Oct/Nov 2016

Book of the Month

Cover of Criminal Injuries Compensation Claims

Criminal Injuries Compensation Claims

Price: £99.95

Pupillage & Student Offers

Special Discounts for Pupils, Newly Called & Students

Read More ...


Secondhand & Out of Print

Browse Secondhand Online

Read More...


Meaning in Law: A Theory of Speech


ISBN13: 9780195388978
Published: August 2009
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Country of Publication: UK
Format: Hardback
Price: £68.00 - Unavailable at Publisher




Also available as
eBook (ePub)
9780190452803
unavailable at publisher
£56.67
+ £11.33 VAT

Existing theories of the First Amendment's protection of speech proceed on the basis of legal doctrine and judicial decision making, social and political philosophy, or legal and intellectual history. Meaning in Law: A Theory of Speech adopts a new approach and develops a general legal theory of speech on the basis of linguistic theory and the philosophy of language.

Meaning in Law: A Theory of Speech retraces the main conceptual stages in the expression of meaning, from natural notions of meaningfulness, through symbolism, to signification. The book focuses on three failed attempts to demarcate the boundaries of "speech" in the constitutional sense (prior restraints, obscenity, and defamation) and then introduces the theory of symbolic speech as the key to developing a general legal theory of speech.

Providing an overview of his theory, including such concepts as "Signaling of Intent" and "Establishing a Convention," author Charles Collier applies these insights to the case law of symbolic speech and resolves some basic confusion in the legal literature. The analysis relies on an original distinction between actual conduct and the "ideal conduct" described in a statute. The former may be described as both communicative and noncommunicative, while the latter has already been conceptualized as either communicative or noncommunicative.

The author argues this distinction clears up a major legal quandary: how conduct that can be described as communication may nevertheless be regulated or prohibited, without running afoul of the First Amendment's protection of speech.