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Vol 22 No 4 April/May 2017

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The Economics of Contracts

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Bernard SalanieHead of the Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle, CREST, Paris, France

ISBN13: 9780262193863
ISBN: 0262193868
Published: June 1999
Publisher: The MIT Press Ltd
Format: Hardback
Price: £25.95

Despatched in 5 to 7 days.

An introduction for graduate students and nonspecialist professional economists to the theory of contracts. The book focuses on the methods used to analyze the models, and discusses a few of the many applications the theory has generated in various fields of economics.

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Part 1 Introduction: the great families of models; the principal-agent model; overview of the book; references.
Part 2 Adverse selection - general theory: mechanism design; a discrete model of price discrimination; the standard model; exercises; references.
Part 3 Adverse selection - examples and extensions: examples of applications; extensions; exercises and references.
Part 4 Signalling models: the market for second-hand cars; costly signals; costless signals; other examples; the informed principal; exercises; references.
Part 5 Moral hazard: a simple example; extensions examples and applications; wage determination; exercises; references.
Part 6 The dynamics of complete contracts: commitment and renegotiation; strategic commitment; what are complete contracts? adverse selection; moral hazard; references.
Part 7 Incomplete contracts: observable but nonverifiable effort; property and residual control rights; contract incompleteness and underinvestment; conclusion remarks; references.
Part 8 Some empirical work: adverse selection models; moral hazard models; conclusion; references. Appendices - some noncooperative game theory: games of perfect information; games of incomplete information.