Comparative Constitutional Design

Subjects:

Comparative Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law

Contents:

1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg

Part I. Design Processes

2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster

3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg

Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions

4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast

5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken

6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom

7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl

Part III. Issues in Institutional Design

8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden

9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel

10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum

11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino

12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele

13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.